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The aim of this paper is to analyse whether institutional factors determine the level of corporate gov-
ernance compliance among major listed companies in emerging markets of Latin America, a region
characterized by a poor legal system, highly concentrated ownership structures, and capital markets
relatively less developed. The paper used an unbalanced panel data consisting of 826 observations of the
highest ranked companies on the stock exchange indices of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico during
the period 2004–2010.eywords:
orporate governance
atings
nstitutional theory
merging markets
The results provide strong empirical evidence that board independence, ownership concentration and
stakeholder orientation affect positively corporate governance ratings, while board size decreases cor-
porate governance compliance in Latin American countries. The study ﬁlls a gap in the Latin American
literature, providing useful information for determining policies on corporate governance and, in general,
for managers and investors of listed companies in Latin America.
© 2016 AEDEM. Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. This is an open access article under the CC
atin America
ntroduction
Corporate Governance [CG] is a relevant issue in academic writ-
ng and ﬁnance and accounting ﬁelds due to the chain of ﬁnancial
candals around the world. CG monitors the effectiveness of man-
gement and ensures legal compliance by preventing irregular and
mproper behaviour. In this sense, leading global institutions such
s the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECD], the International Finance Corporation [IFC] and the World
ank, strongly emphasize the development of different regulations,
uidelines and good governance codes around the world. OECD
fﬁrms that CG “has implications for company behaviour towards
mployees, shareholders, customers and banks”. A corporation’s
orporate governance structure is an important criterion when
nvestors make investment decisions (Epps & Cereola, 2008). In
he case of emerging markets, compliance with good CG practices
s an effective substitute when legal environments and regulatory
rameworks are weak and highly concentrated ownership struc-
ures predominate.In this context, companies that improve their CG practices could
e able of protecting shareholders rights and increase the conﬁ-
ence of investors (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny,
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: guadalupe.briano@uaslp.mx (G.d.C. Briano-Turrent).
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
2000). As a result, different ratings onCG [CGR] have beenproposed
by institutions and academics around the world. The construction
of a rating or index is beneﬁcial as it integrates the various elements
of a ﬁrm’s governance system into one number. Although there is
no standardized system to measure the compliance on CG, prior
research has been developed several CGR mostly for Anglo-Saxon
and continental European countries (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick,
2003; Klapper & Love, 2004). The main objective of the CGR is
to assess and compare the companies’ governance score regarding
the accepted standards issued by regulatory bodies in a particular
institutional context (Al-Malkawi, Pillai, & Bhatti, 2011).
Regarding to factors that affect the CG compliance, prior studies
have recognized the institutional framework in emerging countries
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). Institutional theory integrates a wider
understanding related to cultural dimensions and formal factors
of the ﬁrm in a modern society (Davis, 2005). Therefore, CGR
may be notably inﬂuenced by institutional factors such as cul-
ture, legal structures and ﬁnancial markets (Creed, DeJordy, & Lok,
2010; Peng, Li Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009; Suddaby &Greenwood,
2005). On the other hand, agency theory points out the conﬂict of
interest between management and owners due to separation of
ownership and control. To minimize this divergence and reduce
agency costs, this theoretical approach suggests the adoption of
internal and external mechanisms of CG by companies (Haniffa &
Hudaib, 2006; Tariq & Abbas, 2013). In this study, institutional and
agency theories are adopted as the main reference frameworks to
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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mpirically describe the factors that affect the CG compliance in
atin American listed companies. Formal factors at the macro level
legal system and government initiatives such as CG codes) and at
nter-organizational level (board structure, ownership concentra-
ion or leverage) play an important role by adopting of CG practices
Boliari & Topyan, 2007; Campbell, 2007).
Latin America is characterized by poorer CG and inferior legal
ystem, highly concentrated ownership structures, and capital
arkets relatively less developed in comparison to more devel-
ped OECD economies (Blume & Alonso, 2007). The conﬂict of
nterest between major and minority shareholders reduces over-
ll shareholder value and increases the expropriation of minority
hareholders. Our motivation stems from the growing relevance of
G for investor conﬁdence in the region and the absence of prior
esearch in Latin America, which partly stems the scarcity of rel-
vant data (Kabbach de Castro, Crespi-Cladera, & Aguilera, 2012).
e pay attention in the institutional context, efﬁciency and legiti-
acy of CG mechanisms in an international business environment.
n this sense, the question in this study is how institutional and
gency theories could identify those formal and informal factors
hat promote CG compliance in Latin American listed companies?
Wecontribute to the literature in severalways. First,wepropose
CGRwhich is based on the institutional and regulatory framework
f the region. Second, we support our results using a sample of
26 non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms in fourth largest stock exchanges of the
atin American region (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico), over
he period 2004–2010. Third, we identify institutional formal and
nformal factorsmaybe signiﬁcant to CG compliance throughGMM
ethod addressing the reverse causality problem using suitable
agged values of the explanatory variables as instruments (Blundell
Bond, 1998; Pindado, Requejo, & de la Torre, 2014). Finally, this
tudy may provide useful information for determining policies on
orporate governance and, in general, for managers and investors
n listed companies. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst
tudy that focuses on Latin America emerging countries combining
he institutional and agency theories in a context characterized by
weak legal system and a lower shareholder protection.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. The authors, ﬁrst
resents a review of relevant literature and develop the study
ypotheses. Secondly, the data and construction of the CGR are
resented. Thirdly, we describe the data and methods of analysis.
ourthly we discuss the main results. Last section concludes.
iterature review
The compliance on CG can be looked upon from different theo-
etical perspectives, for instance economic, legal, social and applied
nance (Ariff & Ratnatunga, 2008; Tariq & Abbas, 2013). The theo-
etical foundation can be found in agency theory which points out
hat higher ownership concentration results in a conﬂict between
ajority andminority shareholders,with severalwell-knowncases
f expropriation (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The major problem
f this conﬂict is that minority shareholders are not protected
gainst expropriation bymajority and it ismainly due toweak legal
tructure (enforcement) of countries. Agency theoretical frame-
ork has tried to explain the relationship between shareholders
nd management, seeking the interest’s alignment of managers
nd shareholders with CG mechanisms (Lopes & Walker, 2012).
owever, agency theory is limited and does not explain the multi-
imensional complexity and character of the CG phenomenon in
n international business context (Adegbite, 2015). The conceptual
ramework of institutional theory ismuch broader and deeper than
gency theory, since accounts for the deeper and resilient aspects
f socio-cultural structure, and integrates the process by which
rganizational schemas, rules, norms, and routines are establishedManagement and Business Economics 25 (2016) 63–75
as guidelines for corporate behaviour (Scott, 2004). Furthermore,
this theoretical approach is most suitable to explain CG practices
in contexts characterized by small stock market, a higher level of
ownership concentration in the hands of a few shareholders, and a
strong link between CG structures and institutional development
(Baixauli-Soler & Sanchez-Marin, 2011). Globerman and Shapiro
(2003) observed that formal institutions – regulation, ﬁnancial
markets, transparency and accountability – strengthen the gover-
nance structure and attract more foreign investment. However, in
these countries, informal institutions play an important role when
formal mechanisms prove to be inadequate (Estrin & Prevezer,
2011). The above has caused an increase in the adoption of good
governance practices as part of ﬁrms’ strategy to increase investors’
conﬁdence. In the case of emerging markets, the institutional con-
ditions may explain variations in the level of business activity and
corporate practices (De Clercq, Danis, & Dakhli, 2010).
The adoption of corporate practices and principles co-evolving
with institutions might become institutionalized. Institutionali-
zation implies a certain degree of internalization and cognitive
belief in the practice which is quite distinct from decoupling prac-
tices (Terjesen,Aguilera,&Lorenz, 2015). TheLatinAmericanmodel
of CG is characterized by undeveloped capital markets, weak insti-
tutional environments, highly concentrated ownership structures,
and lowerprotectionof investors (Chong&López-de-Silanes, 2007;
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008). The prolif-
eration of governance codes and adoption of best practices in Latin
America – especially in the larger economies of Argentina, Brazil,
Chile and Mexico which capture 70% of regional market capital-
ization (S&P, 2010) – and the creation of institutions like the Latin
American Corporate Governance Roundtable as a joint initiative of
the International Monetary Fund [IMF], the World Bank, and state
and private actors from Latin and OECD countries, promotes a new
era on CG in the region (Diamandis & Drakos, 2011). The guidelines
issued by the OECD, codes of good governance and the regulations
issued in each of these countries have all contributed to raising the
CG compliance in issues related to the board of directors, share-
holder rights, conﬂicts of interest, ownership structure and support
committees of the board.
Latin American countries have adopted voluntary practices of
CG to cover for the limitations of the regulatory framework. Good
governancecodesand lawsprevailing in the regionhavebeenbased
on the “White Paper” andGCprinciples of theOECD. TheseCGcodes
have promoted transparency and market efﬁciency, the protection
of shareholders and effective board of directors monitoring. Par-
ticularly, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico have opted for soft laws,
through the principle of “comply or explain”. Chile has focused
on hard laws and legal enforcement which aim to strengthen
the board of directors, auditing committee functions, shareholders
rights and reduce conﬂicts of interest, however there are inefﬁcient
self-regulation practices concerning the capital markets (Lefort &
González, 2008).
Recent studies have adopted the institutional-agency theories
to analyse the factors that inﬂuence on CG compliance in different
contexts. For instance, Seal (2006) proposes an institutional the-
ory of agency, which may deﬁned as the analysis of managerial
behaviour in giant, widely owned corporations where manage-
rial action is inﬂuenced by institutionalized practices that affect
corporate practices and performance. This combination of the-
ories establishes managerial behaviour has been inﬂuenced and
legitimized by the dominant discourse of CG – the agency the-
ory. Institutional theory is deﬁned as a set of formal and informal
rules that affect business activity (North, 2005). In this regard,
both formal (e.g. government initiatives, laws; Campbell, 2007) and
informal institutions (e.g. corporate culture and strategy; Boliari
& Topyan, 2007) are regarded as antecedents to action by deﬁn-
ing the CG practices. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983),
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nstitutional theory indicates that ﬁrms tend to incorporate exter-
al norms and rules into their operations and structures in order
o gain legitimacy and social acceptance. Thus, it can be argued
hat companies may gain acceptance and legitimize their oper-
tions by engaging in CG compliance (Ntim, Lindop, & Thomas,
013). Thereby, all forms of institutions that manage human inter-
ctions via cognitive, normative, and regulative processes inﬂuence
rganizational decision-making (Trevino, Thomas, & Cullen, 2008).
ypothesis development
Institutional theory emphasizes that legal rules and norms form
n importantelementofnational institutional systems (Filatotchev,
ackson, & Nakajima, 2013). The groundbreaking work by La Porta,
ópez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (1998) argue that a com-
on element in differences between countries is the degree of
nvestor protection against abuses by the management team and
ajority shareholders. The degree of law enforcement creates
ross-country differences. For instance, civil laws give investors
eaker legal rights than common laws do. The difference in legal
rotections of investors might help explain why ﬁrms are ﬁnanced
nd owned so differently in different regions. Shleifer and Vishny
1997) conclude that a very high ownership concentration may be
reﬂection of poor investor protection. Differences in legal sys-
emshave implications for transparencyonCGpractices, directly or
ndirectly, with ﬁrms in common-law countries disclosingmore CG
nformation than those located in civil-law countries (Li & Moosa,
015). Institutional theory argues that ﬁrms tend to incorporate
xternal norms and rules in order to gain conﬁdence and legiti-
acy in the market (Scott, 1987). Various studies have sought to
easure the degree of enforcement, and Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki
2003) suggested it can be measured through three variables: (a)
he efﬁciency of the judicial system; (b) an evaluation of the rule
f law; (c) an index of corruption. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi
2011) proposed a series of governance indicators including the
imensions of regulatory quality, the rule of law and the control of
orruption. The Worldwide Governance Index [WGI], on the other
and, published by theWGI (2014), includes six dimensions for 213
conomies, assessed for the period 1996–2010: (1) accountability;
2) political stability and absence of violence; (3) governmental
ffectiveness; (4) regulatory quality; (5) the rule of law; (6) the
ontrol of corruption. Hence, our ﬁrst hypothesis is that:
ypothesis 1. There is a positive relation between the WGI and
he CGR in Latin American countries.
The dimensions of CG contained in the codes of good gover-
ance and regulatory framework constitutes formal factors that
ay inﬂuencemanagerial decisions related to the compliance level
n CG (Ho & Wong, 2001).
- Size of the board: The board should comprise a reasonable
umber of directors; its size directly affects its functioning and
upervisory capacity (Gandía, 2008). Larger boards enjoy greater
iversity and tend to have more experienced members, which
ffects the CGR (Gallego Álvarez, García Sánchez, & Rodríguez
omínguez, 2009; Laksamana, 2008). Various studies corroborate
he presence of a positive relationship between board size and the
evel of CG compliance (Barako, Hancock, & Izan, 2006; Hussainey
Al-Najjar, 2011).
ypothesis 2a. Board size has a positive impact on CGR in Latin
merica.
- Composition of the board: External (non-executive) direc-
ors are not part of the company’s management team and so are in
better position tomonitormanagement performance (Donnelly &
ulcahy, 2008). They have an added incentive to facilitate supervi-
ion by shareholders because their own reputation depends on theManagement and Business Economics 25 (2016) 63–75 65
corporate performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983); moreover, they are
the most effective agents for maximizing shareholder value (Rouf,
2011). Most studies afﬁrm there is a positive relationship between
the independenceof theboardandCGR (Abdelsalam&Street, 2007;
Kent & Stewart, 2008; Samaha & Dahawy, 2011).
Hypothesis 2b. There is a positive relationship between the
proportion of independent directors and CGR in Latin American
countries.
- COB-CEO duality: COB-CEO duality refers to the situation
in which the same person holds both positions in a company.
According toHaniffa andCooke (2002), separationbetween the two
positions helps improve the quality of supervision and reduces the
advantages gained by withholding information, while the concen-
tration of power is associatedwith reduced transparency and lower
quality of CG information (Laksamana, 2008).
Hypothesis 2c. There is a negative relationship betweenCOB-CEO
duality and CGR in Latin America.
- The presence of women on the board: In recent years the
issue of gender diversity in business has received considerable
research attention. Women provide viewpoints, experiences and
work styles that differ from those of their male counterparts
(Torchia, Calabró, & Huse, 2011). Among the variables that have
been associated with the presence of women on the board is the
level of CG transparency, thus increasing the board’s capacity to
supervise the process of CG transparency and compliance (Gul,
Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011). Several studies have suggested that gen-
der diversity is associated with a higher quality of boardroom
debate and more effective communication (Hillman, Shropshire,
& Cannella, 2007; Huse & Solberg, 2006), thus facilitating greater
availability of information to investors.
Hypothesis 2d. The proportion of women on the board is posi-
tively associated with the CGR in Latin America.
-Ownership structure:An important factor shaping theCG sys-
tem is the company’s ownership structure, deﬁned as the degree of
concentration that determines thedistributionof power and corpo-
rate control, or as the proportion of voting shares owned directly or
indirectly by seniormanagement, boardmembers or their relatives
(Owusu-Ansah, 1998). When the ownership structure is diffuse,
greater supervision is needed in order to maintain fair access for
minority shareholders. Companies with widely dispersed owner-
ship tend to disclose more information in order to reduce the costs
of control by shareholders (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Furthermore,
this transparency onCG is increasedwhen there are external share-
holders (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008). Some studies have reported
a negative relationship between ownership concentration and the
level of information disclosure (Barako et al., 2006; Gandía, 2008;
Vander Bauwhede & Willekens, 2008, among others). In compa-
nies with large individual shareholders or a high concentration
of ownership, information is transferred directly through informal
channels, or there may simply be a greater alignment of interests,
thus reducing the need to make information public.
Hypothesis 2e. There is a negative association between owner-
ship concentration and CGR in Latin American countries.
- Family-controlled ﬁrms: According to the agency theory,
family controlled ﬁrms create agency costs. The risk of wealth
expropriation from minority shareholders is higher when owner-
ship is concentrated and held by family members (Barontini &
Caprio, 2006). In this sense, CG compliance in family ﬁrms may
become inconsistent with wealth maximization. The combination
of ownership and control in family ﬁrms could generate and exces-
sive role by the owner through its leadership, which could lead to
problems of management entrenchment. Faccio and Lang (2001)
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we glean support for the index from the OECD principles, the codes
of good governance in each country, and previous studies in the
region.
Table 1
Study sample for the period 2004–2010.
Country Year Total
observations
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Argentina 8 8 9 10 10 10 10 65
Brazil 41 46 49 52 53 53 53 3476 G.d.C. Briano-Turrent, L. Rodríguez-Ariza / European Jou
rgue that family ﬁrms present a poor performance compared to no
amily ﬁrms, while San Martin-Reyna and Duran-Encalada (2012),
nticipate problems associated with family ﬁrms and composition
f directors. Family owners could favour family interests over the
rm’s interests (e.g. minority shareholders) and have incentives to
e engaged in opportunistic behaviours, because of loyalty towards
he family (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, &Buchholtz, 2001). Thuswe set
he following hypothesis.
ypothesis 2f. Family-controlled ﬁrms obtain a lower corporate
overnance rating (CGR) than non-family ﬁrms in Latin American
isted ﬁrms.
Institutional theory suggests that a ﬁrm’s right to exist is legit-
mized if its value system is consistent with that of the larger social
ystem of which it is part of, but threatened when there is actual or
otential conﬂict between the two value systems (Suchman, 1995).
iverse interest groups inﬂuence decision-making and the values
doptedby theﬁrm(Donaldson&Preston, 1995). Bradley, Schipani,
undaram, andWalsh (1999) identiﬁed two typesof culture in com-
anies: community or stakeholder-oriented culture, with a broad
ange of members having a legitimate interest in corporate activi-
ies, and shareholder-oriented culture, with a contractual outlook,
n which companies are viewed as tools for creating shareholder
alue, and in which other stakeholders have less legitimacy and
nﬂuence over management. In line with Simnett, Vanstraelen,
nd Fong Chua (2009), in this study we consider the stakeholder
s. shareholder orientation as a dimension of organizational cul-
ure. Under this approach, Smith, Adhikari, and Tondkar (2005)
evealed that companies with a stakeholder-oriented approach
isclose more information as part of their strategic management
pproach in order to strengthen relations with stakeholders, while
asu and Palazzo (2008) suggest that companies could improve
he credibility of their communication by exposing transparency to
uestioning through stakeholders. In the same line, Jansson (2005)
rgues that the stakeholder orientation depends of the governance
nd ownership structure of the ﬁrm and the legal environment.
ypothesis 3. The CGR is higher in ﬁrms with a stakeholder ori-
ntation than in those oriented towards shareholders.
Research on the relationship between CG transparency and
nnovation has been limited (Miozzo & Dewick, 2002). According
o O’Sullivan (2000, p. 1), innovation is performed with the aim
f increasing product quality and/or lower production costs. Inno-
ation can provide the critical component of a ﬁrm’s competitive
trategy.Gill (2008) found that thosecompanies that follow innova-
ion as a strategy disclose more information to signal commitment
o the project, potentially inducing a rival’s exit. Inside directors
re generally associated to innovative strategies, because they have
better knowledge of the company. As a consequence, detailed
nformation is required to make effective strategic decisions and
onitoring (Zahra, 1996). Competitivepressuremightbealleviated
hen ﬁrms that innovate disclose more corporate information to
nduce rivals to wait and imitate instead of simultaneously invest
n innovation (Pacheco-De-Almeida & Zemsky, 2012). By consid-
ring than Latin American countries are characterized by a higher
nside director’s rate (Black, Gledson de Carvalho, & Gorga, 2010),
e argue that innovation strategy inﬂuences the CGR leading to the
ollowing hypothesis:
ypothesis 4. Firms with an innovation strategy obtain higher
GR than ﬁrms with a no innovation strategy.tudy methodology
The object of this study is to analyse the CG ratings of those
ajor listed companies in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. ForManagement and Business Economics 25 (2016) 63–75
the sample of ﬁrms in these four countries, we selected the most
representative of each country. According to Kitagawa and Ribeiro
(2009) the purposes of analysis, we excluded those in the banking
and insurance sectors, because these are more strictly regulated
and are subject to greater scrutiny in terms of corporate informa-
tion disclosure (Garay & González, 2008). The information needed
to construct the index of CG and the set of explanatory variables
used was obtained from the annual reports and websites of the
selectedcompanies, bymeansof contentanalysis. Thecontentanal-
ysis could beused to identify thedifferent CGcategories as reported
by sample ﬁrms to distinguish the different levels of compliance,
depending on the nature of its business and global environment.
Given the qualitative nature of CG disclosure, we perform a con-
tent analysis focusing on the volume and intensity of disclosure
using the number of words and sentences with to different items
of CG categories and sub-categories in order to integrate the CGR
(Lajili & Zéghal, 2005).
For clustering purposes, the companies were ranked according
to the Global Industry Classiﬁcation Standards [GICS], which are
widely accepted in the business and academic worlds (Bhojraj, Lee,
&Oler, 2003). Outliers, or extreme values, for the ﬁnancial variables
were identiﬁed and analysed, and values above the 99th percentile
were assigned the value of this percentile. Values below the ﬁrst
percentile for each variablewere truncated in the sameway (Braga-
Alves & Shastri, 2011).
Initially, 155 companies were considered, but 20 belonging to
theﬁnancial sectorwere excludedaswere a further seven forwhich
therewas insufﬁcient information for analysis. Thus, the ﬁnal study
sample was constituted of 128 companies. Regarding the num-
ber of observations included in this empirical study covering the
time period from 2004 to 2010, data were obtained for 101 com-
panies in 2004, 111 in 2005, 116 in 2006, 123 in 2007, and 125 in
2008, 2009 and 2010. A total of 826 observations were obtained
for the whole period of analysis. Table 1 shows the composition
of the study sample by country. The predominant sectors in these
countries are related to materials, consumer staples and utilities.
Corporate governance rating
Several indices on CG have been developed for Anglo-Saxon
and continental European countries (Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper
& Love, 2004). According with institutional theory, the legal and
institutional context of each country is a key factor in the selec-
tion of the elements of an index (Hossain & Hammami, 2009). This
study proposes a CGR that evidently reﬂects the nature of emerg-
ing Latin American institutional framework, using a combination of
information required by the rules and codes of good governance in
the selected countries. For instance, codes of good and regulatory
framework in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico and Chile. In this study,Chile 24 28 29 31 32 32 32 208
Mexico 28 29 29 30 30 30 30 206
Total observations 101 111 116 123 125 125 125 826
Source: The author.
nal of Management and Business Economics 25 (2016) 63–75 67
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Table 2
Rating of corporate governance.
I. Composition and performance of the board
Mission of the Board (OECD, 1999)
Main functions of the Board (OECD, 1999)
Board independence
Is there or not COB-CEO duality? If only one person holds both positions (Garay &
González, 2008; OECD, 1999; Leal & Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005)
Board structure (external and independent members) (Gandía & Andrés, 2005;
Garay & González, 2008; Leal & Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005; OECD, 1999)
Size of the board (between ﬁve and nine members as an international
recommendation of good governance) (Gandía & Andrés, 2005; Garay &
González, 2008; Leal & Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005; Lefort & Walker, 2005)
Rules of organization and operation of the board and its committees (Gandía &
Andrés, 2005)
Functions and activities of each member of the board (Gandía & Andrés, 2005)
Selection, removal or re-election procedures (Gandía & Andrés, 2005)
Is there a document that establishes the norms of conduct for the board
members? (Gandía & Andrés, 2005)
Are relationships between directors and shareholders of reference disclosed?
(Gandía & Andrés, 2005)
Shareholding of the directors (Gandía & Andrés, 2005)
Conditions determining the independence of the board (Gandía & Andrés, 2005)
The company disclosed the proﬁle and/or curriculum of the board members
(Gandía & Andrés, 2005)
Does the company disclose whether any independent director occupies a
steering position in other companies? (Gandía & Andrés, 2005)
Remuneration of the CEO and board members (Gandía & Andrés, 2005; Garay &
González, 2008; Leal & Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005; OECD, 1999)
Support committees for the board (Garay & González, 2008; Leal &
Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005; Lefort & Walker, 2005; OECD, 1999)
Does the company have a nominating committee?
Does the company have a remuneration committee?
Does the company have a corporate governance committee?
Does the company have an auditing committee?
Are there other additional support committees mentioned above?
Main functions of the committees support on the board
Integration of support committees: Number of executive and independent
members
II. Shareholders rights
Description of shareholder voting process (Garay & González, 2008; Leal &
Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005)
Pyramidal structures that reduce the concentration of control (Garay & González,
2008; Leal & Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005)
Resolutions adopted at the last Annual General Meeting held (Gandía & Andrés,
2005)
Information about the notice of the meeting (Gandía & Andrés, 2005)
Information of the agenda (Gandía & Andrés, 2005)
Information about the text of all resolutions proposed for its adoption (Gandía &
Andrés, 2005)
Shareholder agreements to reduce the concentration of control (Garay &
González, 2008; Leal & Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005)
If the company is listed on other international markets (Lefort & Walker, 2005)
III. Ethics and conﬂicts of interest
Information related to conﬂicts of interest and related party transactions (Leal &
Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005)
If the company is free of any penalty for breach of good governance rules in the
stock market on the last year (Garay & González, 2008)
Detail of the percentage ownership of the company from signiﬁcant shareholders
(Gandía & Andrés, 2005)
Company operations with its directors and managers and to what extent such
transactions are made in competition (Gandía & Andrés, 2005)
Signiﬁcant transactions that have occurred between the company and signiﬁcant
shareholders (Gandía & Andrés, 2005)
Does any member of the board held other positions on the boards in companies
belonging to the same group (Leal & Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005)
Composition of its shareholders (Gandía & Andrés, 2005; Lefort & Walker, 2005)
IV. Other related information with corporate governance
Does the company use the international accounting principles (Garay &
González, 2008; Leal & Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005; OECD, 1999)
Does the company use the services of a recognized auditing ﬁrm (Big 4)? (Garay
& González, 2008; OECD, 1999)
Is the information provided in English?
Sanctions against the management for breach of their corporate governance
practices (Garay & González, 2008; Leal & Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005)
Financial situation and performance (Garay & González, 2008; Leal &
Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005; OECD, 1999)G.d.C. Briano-Turrent, L. Rodríguez-Ariza / European Jour
The overall CGR composed by 43 items, with a maximum value
f 100,was obtainedby summing four sub-indices: (1) composition
ndperformanceof theboard, (2) shareholders rights, (3) ethics and
onﬂicts of interest and (4) other information related with CG. In
ompiling the overall index, each sub-index is weighted as 53, 18,
6 and 13%, respectively (Lefort & González, 2008). Each sub-index
as in turn comprised of a series of factors with the same weights
for more detail see Table 2). The composition and performance
f the board sub-index captures board independence, mission,
unctions, structure and effectiveness. Autonomy is established
hrough various factors of board independence, including the COB-
EO duality and the presence of support committees (nominating,
emuneration, corporate governance, auditing). Furthermore this
ub-index also contains measures of board remuneration, selec-
ion, removal or re-election procedures, and disclosure of proﬁle
r curriculum of directors including the document that establishes
he norms of conduct for the board members. However, most of
he items in this category (at least 14 out of 24) are allocated to
easures that reﬂect board independence.
Shareholders rights comprise the second sub-index, the pur-
ose of which is to identify the mechanisms that encourage the
lignment between board of directors and managers interests with
hose of shareholders. For instance, description of shareholding
oting process, pyramidal structures that reduce the concentra-
ionof control, informationof the agenda, shareholders agreements
nd resolutions proposed for its adoption. The sub-index related
o ethics and conﬂicts of interest attempts to measure conﬂicts of
nterests and related party transactions, company operations with
ts directors and managers, signiﬁcant transactions between the
ompany and signiﬁcant shareholders and ownership composition.
he ﬁnal sub-index deals with other related information with CG.
t attempts to measure a company’s public commitment with good
orporate practices. The use of international accounting principles,
he services of a recognized auditing ﬁrm, sanctions against the
anagement forbreachof their CGpractices, ﬁnancial performance
isclosure, and practices of good governance, score well in this cat-
gory. The index allows each element to be equally important and
oes not distinguish subjective selection of the most inﬂuential
haracteristics (Berglöf & Pajuste, 2005). Nevertheless,we compute
weighted sum of the four dimensions in our calculations.
odel speciﬁcation and measurement of the variables
The following multiple regression model was applied to test
ur hypotheses. The dependent variable is the proposed CGR. The
ndependent and control variableswere determined on the basis of
revious studies and are detailed in Table 3.
GTI = ˇ1WGIit + ˇ2BSit + ˇ3BIit + ˇ4Dualit + ˇ5Genit
+ ˇ6Ownit + ˇ7Famit + ˇ8Stkit + ˇ9Strategyit
+
k∑
k=1
ıkx
k
it + i + εit
here
WGIit = legal system
BSit =board size
BIit =board independence
Dualit =COB-CEO duality
Genit =gender
Ownit =ownership concentration
Famit = family-controlled ﬁrm
Stkit = stakeholder orientation
Stgit = innovation strategy
Practices of good governance (Garay & González, 2008; Leal & Carvalhal-da-Silva,
2005; OECD, 1999)
Source: The author.
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Table 3
Deﬁnition and measurement of the study variables.
Variable Deﬁnition Expected sign Source
Dependent variable
CGTI CG transparency index (43 items) Garay and González (2008); Leal and
Carvalhal-da-Silva (2005); Chong and
López-de-Silanes (2007); Black et al. (2010); OECD
(1999)
Independent variables
Formal institutional variables
Country-level variables
WGI Worldwide Governance Index + Kaufmann et al. (2011); Leuz et al. (2003)
Corporate governance dimensions
Board Size Size of the board: natural logarithm of the number of
board members
+ Pham, Suchard, and Zein (2011); Ezat and El-Masry
(2008), Kent and Stewart (2008); Barako et al.
(2006)
Board Ind Independence of the board: proportion of external board
members to the total number of board members
+ Ezat and El-Masry (2008); Samaha and Dahawy
(2011); Kent and Stewart (2008); Willekens et al.
(2005); Abdelsalam and Street (2007)
Duality COB-CEO duality: Dichotomous variable that takes the
value 1 if both positions are held by the same person and 0
otherwise
− Samaha et al. (2012); Haniffa and Cooke (2002);
Laksamana (2008); Eng and Mak (2003); Ezat and
El-Masry (2008)
Gender Percentage of female members of the board + Huse and Solberg (2006); Hillman et al. (2007); Gul
et al. (2011)
Own Ownership concentration: Percentage of ordinary shares
held by the ten largest shareholders
− Samaha et al. (2012); Donnelly and Mulcahy
(2008); Barako et al. (2006), Vander Bauwhede and
Willekens (2008), Gandía (2008)
Fam Family ﬁrm:
Dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 if family
members holding at least 20% of the equity of the
company, and 0 otherwise
− Chi, Hung, Cheng, and Lieu (2015)
Informal institutional variables at the company level
Stakeholder Dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 if the
company has a stakeholder orientation and 0 if it has a
shareholder orientation
+ Simnett et al. (2009); Bradley et al. (1999); Smith
et al. (2005)
Strategy Presence of an innovation or no innovation strategy:
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the ﬁrm adopts a
strategy of innovation and 0 otherwise
+ Miozzo and Dewick (2002); O’Sullivan (2000); Gill
(2008); Pacheco-De-Almeida and Zemsky (2012)
Control
Lev Level of indebtedness = long-term debt/total assets + Xiao et al. (2004); Jaggi and Low (2000); Willekens
et al. (2005); Ho and Wong (2001)
Age Number of years since the company was founded − Hossain and Hammami (2009); Owusu-Ansah
(1998)
Lnsize Size of the company: natural logarithm of total assets + Hossain and Hammami (2009); Samaha et al.
(2012)
ROA Return on assets, measured as the proportion of net proﬁts
to total assets at the end of each year studied
+ Collet and Hrasky (2005); Gallego Álvarez et al.
(2009)
Ind Business sector (Standard Industrial Classsiﬁcation) ? Gandía (2008)
ed
S
C
u
d
(
C
l
s
p
m
t
pYear Dichotomous variable for each of the 7 years analys
ource: The author.
k∑
k=1
ıkx
k
it
= set of control variables
i =ﬁxed effects at company level
εit =error term
ontrol variables
Leverage. Companies with higher debt levels are generally
nder closer scrutiny by creditors, and have greater incentives to
isclose more information about their management performance
Samaha, Dahawy, Hussainey, & Stapleton, 2012; Xiao, Yang, &
how, 2004).
Age of the company. The age of the ﬁrm can inﬂuence the
evel of corporate transparency, as this represents the company’s
tage of development andgrowth (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Under this
remise, younger ﬁrms tend to disclose less information thanmore
ature ones, for three reasons: (1) greater transparency can affect
heir competitive advantage; (2) the cost and ease of information
rocessing anddisclosure is greater; (3) the relative absenceof suchinformation. In our study, we expect to ﬁnd a negative relationship
between these two variables (Hossain & Hammami, 2009).
Size of the company. Most studies have found that company
size positively affects the level of corporate information disclosure
(Bassett, Koh,&Tutticci, 2007). Larger companieshave certain char-
acteristics that differentiate them from smaller ones, such as the
greater diversity of products, more complex distribution networks
and greater need for funding from capital markets (Gallego Álvarez
et al., 2009).
Proﬁtability. Managers disclose more detailed information to
ensure the continuity of their positions and remuneration and as a
sign of institutional conﬁdence. Inchausti (1997) argues that more
proﬁtable companies make greater use of information in order to
obtain a competitive advantage,whileﬁrmswithpoorperformance
may be less transparent. Previous studies mainly reﬂect a positive
relation (Apostolos & Konstantinos, 2009).
Business sector. The business sector is another variable that has
often been used to account for the amount of information provided
by companies (Eng &Mak, 2003). Companies operating in the same
sector are believed to disclose similar information in the market, to
avoid sendingabadsignal to investors (Watts&Zimmerman,1986).
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics on the dependent and independent variables (2004).
Variable N Mean Standard deviation Minimum Median Maximum
CGTI 101 0.53 0.17 0.12 0.56 0.81
Argentina 8 0.36 0.16 0.12 0.33 0.61
Brazil 41 0.48 0.18 0.12 0.49 0.79
Chile 24 0.53 0.10 0.37 0.50 0.72
Mexico 28 0.66 0.12 0.28 0.67 0.81
WGI 101 0.59 0.16 0.38 0.52 0.86
Board size 101 9.68 3.69 3.00 9.00 20.00
Board independence 101 0.33 0.22 0.00 0.33 0.73
Duality COB-CEO 101
Duality 29 28.7%
No duality 72 71.3%
Gender 101 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.33
Ownership 101 0.57 0.18 0.15 0.55 0.99
Family-controlled ﬁrm 101
Family 42 41.6%
No family 59 58.4%
Stakeholder orientation 101
Shareholder 49 74.3% 0.14 0.00 0.24 0.59
Stakeholder 52 25.7% 35.34 1.00 42.00 154.00
Strategy 101
Innovation 78 77.2%
No innovation 23 22.8%
Leverage 101 0.23 1.37 3.23 7.72 11.88
Age 101 48.31 0.08 −0.13 0.10 0.38
Lnsize 101 7.83
ROA 101 0.11
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ompaniesoperating inmorepoliticallyvisible sectorshavegreater
ncentives to voluntarily disclose information in order to minimize
ny political costs (Collet & Hrasky, 2005). The studies that have
eported a signiﬁcant relationship between the business sector and
he disclosure of information include Gandía (2008), Bonsón and
scobar (2006) and Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003).
esults
escriptive analysis of the data
Tables 4 and5 summarize thedescriptivedata for thedependent
nd independent variables for 2004 and 2010 study periods.
In the countries analysed, the CGR increased during the study
eriod; the average value was 0.36 (median 0.33) in 2004 in
rgentina, while in Brazil it was 0.48 (median 0.49). For ﬁrms in
hile, the average was 0.53 (median 0.50), and in Mexico, 0.66
median 0.67). Mexico presented the highest index value, followed
yChile, Brazil andArgentina. In2010 the index showedan increase
n the four countries under analysis. For instance, Argentina aver-
ged 0.64 (median 0.66), Brazil 0.72 (median 0.74), Chile 0.64
median 0.61), and in Mexico, 0.78 (median 0.79). The results sug-
est a favourable evolution of the formal institutional environment
n the region, since the codes of good governance and regulations
ave increased and revised several times. Differences between
ountries are mainly due to the codes of good governance of each
ountry, which require of different levels and dimensions of corpo-
ate transparency.
Regarding the institutional formal factors, legal systemrecorded
n average value of 0.59 for the WGI, with Chile obtaining the
ighest value, followed by Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. The
xplanatory variables related to CG dimensions include the size
nd composition of the board. The ﬁrms analysed had an aver-
ge of 9.6 directors in 2004 and 10 in 2010. Although there wasno signiﬁcant variation in the average board size during the study
period, we did ﬁnd that the rules and codes of good governance
within each country applied diverse criteria regarding this parame-
ter (recommending5–9members inBrazil, aminimumof7 inChile,
and between 3 and 15 in Mexico, with no recommendation being
made in Argentina). Regarding board composition, for the region as
a whole the average number of external directors was 0.33 in 2004
and 0.38 in 2010. In Argentina, the corresponding values were 0.20
(median 0.18) in 2004 and 0.31 (median 0.32) in 2010. In Brazil,
these values were 0.25 (median 0.21) in 2004 and 0.34 (median
0.33) in 2010. According to Black et al. (2010), the independence of
the board is a notoriously weak area in Brazil, with most company
boards being composed of representatives of the controlling group.
Chile presented an average value for independent directors of 0.38
(median 0.33) in 2004 and0.38 (median 0.33) in 2010. Finally,Mex-
ican ﬁrms had an average of 0.46 (median 0.47) in 2004 and 0.49
(median 0.50) in 2010, and so these companies had the highest
proportion of independent directors in our study group, perhaps
because the code of corporate governance in this country stipulates
aminimumproportionof independentdirectors (25%),whereas the
other countries specify neither their number nor their proportion.
COB-CEO duality was found in 28.7% of the ﬁrms analysed in
2004 and in 21.6% in 2010, occurring most frequently in Argentina
andMexico. In these emerging economies in Latin America, there is
a growing presence of women on boards of directors. Nevertheless,
the total numbers remain far from signiﬁcant; the highest level of
female participation is found in Brazil, but the regional averagewas
barely 4% in 2004 and 5% in 2010.
A clear ownership concentration is observed in the region,
although this has been declining in the analysed period. Among
the companies examined, the average proportion of shares held
by the top ten shareholders was 57% (median 51%) in 2004 and
55% (median 54%) in 2010. With respect to family-controlled vari-
able, we observe that 41.6% of the ﬁrms are controlled by families,
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Table 5
Descriptive statistics on the dependent and independent variables (2010).
Variable N Mean Standard deviation Minimum Median Maximum
CGTI 125 0.70 0.12 0.37 0.74 0.88
Argentina 10 0.64 0.16 0.40 0.66 0.84
Brazil 53 0.72 0.12 0.37 0.74 0.88
Chile 32 0.64 0.08 0.54 0.61 0.86
Mexico 30 0.78 0.07 0.61 0.79 0.88
WGI 125 0.60 0.15 0.42 0.57 0.84
Board size 125 9.94 3.55 3.00 9.00 21.00
Board independence 125 0.38 0.19 0.00 0.33 0.78
Duality COB-CEO 125
Duality 27 21.6%
No duality 98 78.4%
Gender 125 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.33
Ownership 125 0.54 0.17 0.13 0.54 0.87
Family-controlled ﬁrm 125
Family 59 47.2%
No family 66 52.8%
Stakeholder 125
Shareholder 21 16.8%
Stakeholder 104 83.2%
Strategy 125
Innovation 103 82.4%
No innovation 22 17.6%
Leverage 125 0.29 0.15 0.00 0.30 0.68
Age 125 49.95 34.78 3.00 43.00 160.00
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ROA 125 0.10 0.08
ource: The authors.
ompared with 58.4% of non-family ﬁrms. In 2010, the percent-
ge of family ﬁrms increased to 47.2% while non-family companies
ecreased to 52.8%.
With regard to informal factors, we observed an institution-
lization of corporate culture towards a stakeholder orientation.
hus, only 51.5% of these companieswere basically stakeholder ori-
nted in 2004,while in 2010 this ﬁgure had increased to 83.2%. This
rend reﬂects growing interest among companies in considering a
roader rangeofparticipants, and this in turnhasabearingon levels
f corporate transparency. In respect of the corporate strategy fol-
owed by studied ﬁrms, predominates innovation strategy (77.2%)
ompared with no innovation strategy (22.8%) in 2004, while in
010 the adoption of innovation strategy increased to 82.4% com-
ared with no innovation strategy (17.6%).
Regarding the control variables, the average level of leverage in
he region was 23% in 2004 and 29% in 2010, and higher among
ompanies in Brazil, Chile and Mexico. The average age of these
rms, from their founding, was 48.31 years in 2004 and 49.95 years
n 2010. Firm size, measured by the natural logarithm of its assets,
as highest in Brazil, followed by Mexico and Chile. The regional
verage was 7.83 in 2004 and 8.72 in 2010. Finally, the descriptive
tatistics for the variable measuring ﬁnancial performance [ROA]
howed that the best performance was obtained in Argentina, fol-
owed by Mexico, Brazil and Chile. The overall average for these
ountries was 0.11 in 2004 and 0.10 in 2010.
ivariate analysis (correlation matrix)
Thepotentialmulticollinearity among the explanatory variables
as analysed to obtain the variance inﬂation factor [VIF] and level
f tolerance. Table 6 (Panel A) shows the Pearson coefﬁcients for all
he study variables. This correlation analysis shows that the CGR
s positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with board size, board
ndependence, COB-CEO duality, stakeholder orientation, size of5.91 8.66 14.98
−0.05 0.08 0.65
the ﬁrm and year of study (p<0.01, two-tailed test); and leverage
(p<0.05, two-tailed test).
The CGR is negatively correlated with the WGI and ownership
concentration (p<0.01, two-tailed test); andcorporate strategyand
industry type (p<0.05, two-tailed test). We also observe that the
highest valueof the correlationbetween independent variables and
CGR is 0.400 (board size). According to Gujarati (2003) correlations
between the independent variables are not considered harmful to
the multivariate analysis at least exceeding 0.80.
Panel B shows the coefﬁcients for VIF and tolerance, whichmust
be within the limits proposed by Xiao et al. (2004), i.e. less than 2
for VIF and above 0.60 for the tolerance level. In this line, Neter,
Wasserman, and Kutner (1989) proposed that the VIF coefﬁcient
should not exceed 10, since that would indicate the presence of
damaging multicollinearity. On the other hand, if the average VIF
were substantially less than 1 this would indicate that the regres-
sion analysis might be biased (Bowerman & O’Connell, 1990). Our
study obtained an average VIF of 1.228, which is in line with the
values obtained by Hossain and Hammami (2009) and Shan and
Mclver (2011), who conﬁrmed that their model had no multi-
collinearity, with VIF values of 1.47 and 1.42 respectively. The VIF
was within the recommended limits, while the correlation matrix
revealed no major correlation problems among the variables.
Analysis of results
Table 7 shows the multivariate analysis results for the pro-
posed hypotheses. First, multiple regression analysis [OLS] with
robust estimator (VCE) was performed, including the industry and
the year of study as dummy variables, to incorporate their possi-
ble effects. Subsequently, we use the GMM system to account for
endogeneity of all time-varying explanatory variables (Bloom&van
Reenen, 2007; Pindado et al., 2014).We have adopted GMM to con-
trol for endogeneity and reduce the risk of obtaining biased results
due to correlation between error term and explanatory variables.
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Table 6
Correlations and collinearity diagnostics.
Panel A: Pearson correlation coefﬁcients
CGTI WGI Board
size (Ln)
Board
composi-
tion
COB-CEO
duality
Gender Ownership Family-
controlled
ﬁrm
Stakeholder Strategy Leverage Age Size
company
ROA Industry
type
Year
CGR 1.000
WGI −0.205** 1.000
Board size (Ln) 0.400** −0.318** 1.000
Board composition 0.269** −0.026 0.199** 1.000
COB-CEO duality 0.103** −0.305** 0.214** 0.215** 1.000
Gender −0.028 −0.125** −0.046 −0.122** −0.069* 1.000
Ownership −0.156** 0.069* −0.139** −0.220** −0.150** 0.118** 1.000
Family-controlled ﬁrm 0.003 0.028 −0.019 0.155** 0.200** −0.073* 0.221** 1.000
Stakeholder 0.159** 0.116** −0.014 −0.008 −0.077* 0.086* 0.098** −0.024 1.000
Strategy −0.084* 0.030 0.011 −0.025 −0.016 0.059 0.048 0.024 −0.020 1.000
Leverage 0.066 0.113** −0.067* −0.080* −0.082* 0.166** −0.069* −0.183** 0.155** 0.070* 1.000
Age 0.020 0.243** −0.009 0.050 −0.197** 0.070* 0.057 −0.079* 0.150** 0.056 0.099** 1.000
Size company 0.272** −0.140** 0.145** −0.051 −0.056 0.188** −0.037 −0.324** 0.188** 0.061 0.272** 0.139** 1.000
ROA −0.10 −0.167** 0.068 0.004 0.013 −0.018 0.098** −0.050 0.017 0.046 −0.127** 0.071* −0.038 1.000
Industry sector −0.054 0.089* −0.056 −0.132** −0.204** 0.191** 0.237** −0.222** 0.037 0.027 0.136** 0.008 0.137** −0.107** 1.000
Year 0.374** 0.019 0.044 0.078* −0.04 0.018 −0.056 0.032 0.215** −0.023 0.128** 0.039 0.210** −0.106** −0.010 1.000
Panel B: collinearity diagnostics
Variance inﬂation and tolerance factors
Variable VIF Tolerance
(Constant)
WGI 1.405 0.712
Board size (Ln) 1.239 0.807
Board composition 1.186 0.843
COB-CEO duality 1.292 0.774
Gender 1.140 0.877
Ownership concentration 1.316 0.760
Family-controlled ﬁrm 1.402 0.713
Stakeholder 1.129 0.886
Strategy 1.019 0.981
Leverage 1.218 0.821
Age 1.176 0.850
Size company 1.358 0.737
ROA 1.166 0.858
Year 1.128 0.887
Industry type 1.251 0.800
Source: The authors.
* Correlation is signiﬁcant at 0.051 level (two-tailed test).
** Correlation is signiﬁcant at 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
1. The variables are deﬁned in Table 3.
2. The coefﬁcients are based on 826 observations.
3. Independent variable: CGR.
4. VIF = variance inﬂation.
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Table 7
Formal and informal institutional factors on CGR.
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2
Pooled data (MCO).
Robust estimator (vce)
Estimation
with GMM
WGI 0.581*** 0.083
0.200 0.107
Board size (Ln) 0.069*** −0.064**
0.02 0.029
Board composition 0.078*** 0.071**
0.023 0.034
COB-CEO duality −0.010 −0.010
0.011 0.017
Gender −0.240*** 0.040
0.071 0.077
Ownership −0.029 0.107**
0.025 0.040
Family-controlled ﬁrm 0.001 −0.034
0.01 0.031
Stakeholder 0.034*** 0.027***
0.010 0.009
Strategy −0.034*** −0.002
0.012 0.007
Leverage 0.094*** −0.012
0.035 0.032
Age 0.010* 0.029*
0.005 0.018
Company size 0.015*** 0.001
0.004 0.009
ROA 0.092 −0.026
0.071 0.058
Constant 0.085 0.147
0.144 0.093
Total observations 826 451
R adjusted squared 0.4935
Source: The authors.
Corrected standard errors are shown in italics.
GMM-type: L(2/.).cgt. Chi2 = 0.000.
* Statistical signiﬁcance: p .05.
** Statistical signiﬁcance: p .01.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance: p .001.
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Regarding the variables that were not statistically signiﬁcant,Statistical signiﬁcance: p .10.
MM relies on set of “internal” instruments (lags of explanatory
ariables), eliminating the need of external instrumental vari-
bles (Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012). The multiple regression
odel (Model 1) was found statistically signiﬁcant (p>0.000). The
djusted coefﬁcient of determination (R2) indicates that 49.35% of
hevariation in thedependent variable is explainedby the indepen-
ent variables. The coefﬁcients show that statistically signiﬁcant
ormal institutional variables in themodel are legal system (+), size
f the board (+), independence of the board (+), and participation
f women on the board (−). The signiﬁcant informal institutional
ariables in the model are stakeholder orientation (+) and the
nnovation strategy (−). Finally, COB-CEO duality and ownership
oncentration are not signiﬁcant in this model. Regarding the con-
rol variables, leverage (+), age of the company (−) and its size (+)
re signiﬁcant, while proﬁtability does not present any association.
Continuing our analysis, the panel data highlighted problems of
eteroscedasticity, endogeneity and correlation. To address these
ssues, we estimate the model using GMM method, because it is an
nstrumental variable estimator that embeds all other instrumen-
al variables as special cases (Pindado et al., 2014). Model 2 shows
hat the positive, statistically signiﬁcant relations were indepen-
ence of the board (p=0.05), ownership concentration (p=0.05),
takeholder orientation (p=0.01) and age of the company (p=0.10).
e could identify a negative relation between CGR and board sizep=0.05). No signiﬁcant relationships were found between CGR
nd legal system, COB-CEO duality, gender, family controlled ﬁrm,
trategy, leverage, company size and proﬁtability.Management and Business Economics 25 (2016) 63–75
The results obtained also suggest that CGR in the energy
sector is higher than in other sectors. From 2005, signiﬁcant dif-
ferences began to appear in the levels of transparency in the
countries analysed. These ﬁndings are supported by Archambault
and Archambault (2003), who concluded that the decision to adopt
and publish corporate information is inﬂuenced by informal fac-
tors such as culture, regulatory system and the corporate system.
Berglöf and Pajuste (2005), on the other hand, suggested that com-
panies’ corporate practices depend on the legal environment and
practices prevailing in each country, company size and the concen-
tration of ownership. Barako et al. (2006) carried out a longitudinal
study using panel data methodology, and found a signiﬁcant asso-
ciation between the level of corporate transparency and the CG
attributes of the company, such as ownership structure and other
characteristics. In the same vein, Samaha et al. (2012), studying
ﬁrms in Egypt, argued that the proportion of independent direc-
tors and ﬁrm size are two factors that positively affect the level of
CG compliance.
In this study, we observed a signiﬁcant inverse association
between the level of CG transparency and independence on the
board, and so hypothesis H2a, which predicted a positive relation-
ship between these variables, is rejected. These results are in line
with those found byMak andKusnadi (2005),who argue that larger
boards inhibit the motivation and participation of their members
in the strategic taking decisions process, and therefore its impact
negatively on the CG compliance.
The results for the CG dimensions show there is a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant (5% level) between independence of their
members with CGR; therefore, hypotheses H2b is accepted. These
results are aligned with those reported by Samaha et al. (2012)
who showed that CGR for listed companies in Egypt increases in
proportion with the number of independent directors and com-
pany size. In this context, our study shows that diversity in the
boards provide the experience and knowledge necessary for ade-
quate performance of their functions, and tend to increase the level
of CGR (Ezat & El-Masry, 2008; Gandía, 2008; Kent & Stewart, 2008;
Willekens, Vander Bauwhede, Gaeremynck, & Van de Gucht, 2005).
The presence of independent members on the board represents a
means of control that improves its effectiveness, focusing its atten-
tion on the actions of the management team and on ensuring the
shareholders’ goals are achieved, all ofwhich is reﬂected in a higher
level of CGR (Fama & Jensen, 1983). These consequences have also
been reported for the level of CG transparency in other emerging
countries (Ezat & El-Masry, 2008; Samaha & Dahawy, 2011).
With respect to ownership concentration, the results show a
signiﬁcant and positive inﬂuence on CGR, opposite our established
premise. In this sense we have rejected the H2e which suggested
a negative relation. According to Haniffa and Cooke (2002), the
ownership concentration could reduce the freedom of the man-
agement team and lead to a more efﬁcient behaviour such as CG
compliance.
Hypothesis 3 regarding to stakeholder orientation has been
accepted. Thus, ﬁrms with a stakeholder-oriented approach will
tend to adopt more CG practices as part of their strategic
management and as a process of continuous and interactive com-
munication between the company and its stakeholders (Fasterling,
2012). The signiﬁcant control variables in the model is the age
of the company, with a positive impact on the CGR, a ﬁnding
that is in line with the results of Hossain and Hammami (2009)
and Owusu-Ansah (1998), who argued that younger ﬁrms publish
less information to maintain their competitive advantage, and also
because they have a shorter history to communicate.we observed that the legal system is not a determinant factor in
CGR in Latin American region. Jaggi and Low (2000) considered the
legal systemtobe themost signiﬁcant institution affectingbusiness
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ctivity, while Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004) observed a
ositive relationship between the level of CG compliance and the
trength of the legal system. However, in Latin American case this
ariable is not signiﬁcant.
The hypotheses rejected concerned the COB-CEO duality (H2c),
ender of the board (H2d), the family controlled ﬁrm (H2f), strat-
gy (H4), and the control variablesof leverage, size andproﬁtability,
one of which accounted for the CGR. Previous studies have sug-
ested that in the case of emerging or developing countries the
esults of this type of analysis could differ from those found in
eveloped economies (Archambault & Archambault, 2003). On the
ther hand, COB-CEO duality and family controlled ﬁrms do not
eem to affect the level of CG compliance, which is in line with the
esults obtained by Ho and Wong (2001), Eng and Mak (2003) and
aniffa and Cooke (2002).
onclusions
This study contributes to the literature pertaining to how for-
al and informal factors promote a higher CG compliance on
isted companies of Latin American emerging markets. Most of
rior research has focused on developed countries and they have
ssociated institutional factors such as culture, legal system and
nancial factors with corporate and transparency practices, while
gency theory suggest that internal and external dimensions of CG
board of directors, ownership concentration, legal system) could
inimize the conﬂict of interest between majority and minority
hareholders in countries where legal system and shareholders’
rotection is poor (Creed et al., 2010; Peng et al., 2009; Tariq &
bbas, 2013).
This study obtained a comparative study of four emerging
conomies in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico),
nd the results indicate a rising trend in CG compliance during the
eriod 2004–2010. Our analysis shows that the variables that affect
GR in this regionare the independenceof theboard, theownership
oncentration, stakeholderorientation, and theageof the company.
hese results are consistent with the ﬁndings of Kent and Stewart
2008) and Samaha and Dahawy (2011) who afﬁrm that indepen-
ent directors promote a higher supervision and control in order
o keep their reputation on the market. By contrast, larger boards
nﬂuence negatively in the level on CG because a greater diversity
f opinions may hinder a consensus to adopt corporate practices.
ontrary to theproposedhypothesis, our results demonstrated that
wnership concentration affect positively the CGR, since the region
s characterized by a weak legal system and a poorer protection
f shareholders, so ownership concentration becomes a control
echanism to substitute this absence and promotes the adoption
f good governance practices (Gandía, 2008; Vander Bauwhede &
illekens, 2008). In the case of informal factors, stakeholder ori-
ntation motivates the credibility and transparency on corporate
ractices in weak legal environments (Basu & Palazzo, 2008). In
he case of female presence in the board, family element and legal
ystem were no signiﬁcant in the analysis, since the institutional
ramework in Latin America differ from other countries previously
tudied, both normative and cultural aspects.
Our research also considered the endogeneity problem in the
mpirical analysis of CGR. The endogeneity problem in this issue is
mportant, for it is highly likely that observable and unobservable
nstitutional factors may affect CG compliance, and some of ﬁrm-
peciﬁc characteristics could inﬂuence the rating on CG.
This study has the following limitations. First, the study vari-
bles, compiled from the companies’ annual reports, inevitably
eﬂected the subjective judgement of the researchers, which could
ead to errors of interpretation andof information compilation. Sec-
nd, the proposed CGR was un-weighted. On the one hand, thisManagement and Business Economics 25 (2016) 63–75 73
presents the disadvantage that all the index items are awarded the
same importance; however, to thebest of our knowledge there is no
established methodology to assign a single weighting criterion for
such an analysis, and the use of an un-weighted index does reduce
the problem of subjectivity. Third, we focused on obtaining infor-
mation on CG and the study variables from three main sources: the
companies’ annual reports, the CG reports and the companies’web-
sites; thuswedid not consider press reports or other communiqués
that may be issued by listed companies. Fourth, there is some sub-
jectivity in the selection of the explanatory variables. Given the
extensive literature in this ﬁeld of research and the large number
of variables that have been identiﬁed, we chose to include those
appearing most frequently in previous studies. This limitation is
mitigated by the use of panel data methodology and GMM system,
which takes into account the problem of omitted variables. Fifth,
our study considers only the listed companies with the highest
rankings in four Latin American stock markets, and omits compa-
nies in other indices and non-listed companies. Nevertheless, we
achieved a sufﬁcient number of observations for panel data analysis
to be applied.
Despite the above limitations, the results obtained constitute
a benchmark for managers responsible for determining CG poli-
cies and legislation in the countries under study. These results
reﬂect the current statusof the regionconcerningCGandcouldhelp
identify the dimensions and elements of CGR that favour regional
convergence. Moreover, this paper opens up interesting areas for
future research, highlighting the impact of certain ethical values
and risk taking behaviour. It would be useful to extend this study
to consider the inﬂuence of other cultural variables such as the
nationality, age, education and experience of company directors
or managers on the level of CG compliance, and to analyse other
formal institutional factors such as directors’ remuneration, the
composition of support committees and the frequency of board
and support committee meetings. Another area of interest would
be to analyse the impact of the rating and its sub-indices on meas-
ures of corporate performance or risk, or perhaps the impact of
formal and informal institutional factors on these same measures.
Furthermore, the study sample could be expanded to include com-
panies listed on the continuous market. An important extension
of our work would be to include other countries, both emerging
and Anglo-Saxon and Continental countries, and thus incorporate
a greater number of country-level variables. Another interesting
line would be to carry out a longitudinal study by business sector,
to determine the impact of formal and informal institutional factors
on a speciﬁc area of activity, and at the same time, a larger number
of countries might be included.
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